What Affects the Perceived Power of Farmers’ Associations? Insights from Members’ Opinions

Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska; Łukasz Widła-Domaradzki

doi:10.53098/wir.2025.2.207/01

Autor

Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska Dominika Milczarek-Andrzejewska, PhD Hab., Associate Professor, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, 44/50 Długa St., 00-241 Warsaw, Poland https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9624-1591
Łukasz Widła-Domaradzki Łukasz Widła-Domaradzki, Institute of Labour and Social Affairs (IPiSS), 3B Bellottiego St., 01-022 Warsaw, Poland https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3197-1411

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53098/wir.2025.2.207/01

Słowa kluczowe:

grupy interesu, sektor rolny, postrzegana siła, modelowanie równań strukturalnych, Polska

Abstrakt

Organizacje rolnicze w Unii Europejskiej (UE) są zwykle przedstawiane jako silne grupy interesu posiadające znaczne zasoby oraz możliwości wpływu na politykę państwa. W wielu nowych państwach członkowskich UE obraz ten odbiega jednak od rzeczywistości. Dodatkowo brakuje dogłębnych badań dotyczących siły organizacji rolniczych w krajach postsocjalistycznych. Celem niniejszego artykułu było więc empiryczne zbadanie postrzeganej siły, zasobów i kanałów, których używają polskie organizacje do wpływania na politykę rolną. Zbadano subiektywne opinie członków organizacji, ponieważ mogą one dostarczyć dodatkowych informacji na temat działań grup interesu, takich jak proces mobilizacji rolników. Wykorzystując unikalne dane z ankiety i modele równań strukturalnych, pokazano, że organizacje rolników w Polsce są postrzegane przez swoich członków jako silniejsze, jeśli mają więcej zasobów, zwłaszcza tych wynikających ze współpracy między organizacjami.

Publication under the research funded by the National Science Centre (NCN), Poland (grant no. 2013/11/B/HS4/01691). The authors would like to thank: Jan Fałkowski, Markus Hanisch, Ruta Śpiewak, and participants of seminars and conferences in Gaeta, Gdańsk, Parma, Rome, Wageningen and Warsaw for their helpful comments.

Bibliografia

Barney J.B., Ketchen D.J., Wright M. (2011). The future of resource-based theory: Revitalization or decline? Journal of Management, 37(5), 1299–1315. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310391805

Baumgartner F.R., Berry J.M., Hojnacki M., Kimball D.C., Leechet B.L. (2009). Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: Chicago University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226039466.001.0001

Bavorova M., Curtiss J., Jelinek L. (2005). Czech Agricultural Associations and the Impact of Membership on Farm Efficiency. Paper presented at the 94th EAAE Seminar “From Households to Firms with Independent Legal Status: The Spectrum of Institutional Units in the Development of European Agriculture”.

Bayard B., Jolly C. (2007). Environmental behavior structure and socio-economic conditions of hillside farmers: A multiple-group structural equation modeling approach. Ecological Economics, 62(3–4), 433–440. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.07.004

Bednaříková Z., Jílková J. (2012). Why is the agricultural lobby in the European Union member states so effective? E a M: Ekonomie a Management, 15(2), 26–37.

Beyers J. (2004). Voice and access: Political practices of European interest associations. European Union Politics, 5(2), 211–240. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116504042442

Bilewicz A. (2020). Beyond the modernisation paradigm: Elements of a food sovereignty discourse in farmer protest movements and alternative food networks in Poland. Sociologia Ruralis, 60(4), 754–772. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12295

Bilewicz A., Mamonova N., Burdyka K. (2022). “Paradoxical” dissatisfaction among post-socialist farmers with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy: A study of farmers’ subjectivities in rural Poland. East European Politics and Societies, 36(3), 892–912. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/08883254211036717

Binderkrantz A.S., Christiansen P.M., Pedersen H.H. (2015). Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. Governance, 28(1), 95–112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12089

Binderkrantz A.S., Rasmussen A. (2015). Comparing the domestic and the EU lobbying context: Perceived agenda-setting influence in the multi-level system of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(4), 552–569. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1008553

Crombois J.F. (2019). Central and Eastern European business interest associations and EU policy making. Journal of Public Affairs, 19(1), 1–8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1827

Daxecker U., Di Salvatore J., Ruggeri A. (2019). Fraud is what people make of it: Election fraud, perceived fraud, and protesting in Nigeria. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(9), 2098–2127. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718824636

Deininger K. (2003). Land markets in developing and transition economies: Impact of liberalization and implications for future reform. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(5), 1217–1222. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2003.00533.x

Dobbins M., Horvath B., Labanino R.P. (2022). Exploring the domestic and international drivers of professionalization of Central and Eastern European interest groups. European Political Science Review, 14(2), 263–280. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773922000054

Dür A. (2008a). Interest groups in the European Union: How powerful are they? West European Politics, 31(6), 1212–1230. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802372662

Dür A. (2008b). Measuring interest group influence in the EU: A note on methodology. European Union Politics, 9(4), 559–576. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508095151

Dür A., Bernhagen P., Marshall D. (2015). Interest group success in the European Union: When (and why) does business lose? Comparative Political Studies, 48(8), 951–983. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014565890

Eising R. (2017). Studying interest groups: methodological challenges and tools. European Political Science, 16(3), 291–305. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.14

Eising R., Rasch D., Rozbicka P. (2017). National interest organisations in EU policy-making. West European Politics, 40(5), 939–956. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1320174

Evanson R.K. (2008). Economic interest groups and the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic. Journal of Public Affairs, 8(1/2), 33–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.283

Fałkowski J. (2018). Together we stand, divided we fall? Smallholders’ access to political power and their place in Poland’s agricultural system. Journal of Agrarian Change, 18(4), 893–903. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12278

Fałkowski J., Chlebicka A., Łopaciuk-Gonczaryk B. (2017). Social relationships and governing collaborative actions in rural areas: Some evidence from agricultural producer groups in Poland. Journal of Rural Studies, 49, 104–116. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.11.010

Fałkowski J., Malak-Rawlikowska A., Milczarek-Andrzejewska D. (2017). Farmers’ self-reported bargaining power and price heterogeneity: Evidence from the dairy supply chain. British Food Journal, 119(8), 1672–1686. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/BFJ-11-2016-0570

Feng H., Wang T., Hennessy D.A., Arora G. (2022). Over-perception about land use changes: Assessing empirical evidence and linkage with decisions and motivated beliefs. Land Economics, 98(2), 254–273. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.2.040920-0052R

Finger R., Fabry A., Candel J., Dalhaus T., Meemken E.M. (2024). Farmer protests in Europe 2023–2024. EuroChoices, 23(3), 59–63. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-692X.12452

Fischer C., Hartmann M., Bavorova M., Hockmann H., Suvanto H., Viitaharju L., Leat P., Revoredo-Giha C., Henchion M., McGee C., Dybowski G., Kobuszynska M. (2008). Business relationships and B2B communication in selected European agri-food chains – first empirical evidence. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 11(2), 73–100.

Foryś G. (2021). Dynamics of changes in the farmers’ contestation in Poland in 1989–2018. In: P. Pospěch, E.M. Fuglestad, E. Figueiredo (eds.). Politics and Policies of Rural Authenticity (pp. 170–186). London: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003091714-14

Foryś G. (2008). Z badań nad protestami rolniczymi w Polsce. Wieś i Rolnictwo, 4(141), 9–28. DOI: https://doi.org/10.53098/wir.2008.4.141/01

Gorton M., Angell R., Dries L., Urutyan V., Jackson E., White J. (2015). Power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy sector. Industrial Marketing Management, 50, 69–77. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.05.024

Grossman G.M., Helpman E. (2001). Special Interest Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hagedorn K. (2014). Post-socialist farmers’ cooperatives in Central and Eastern Europe. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 85(4), 555–577. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12051

Hajdu A., Mamonova N. (2020). Prospects of agrarian populism and food sovereignty movement in post-socialist Romania. Sociologia Ruralis, 60(4), 880–904. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12301

Halamska M. (2008). Organizacje rolników: bilans niesentymentalny. In: M. Halamska (ed.). Wiejskie organizacje pozarządowe (pp. 103–133). Warszawa: Instytut Rozwoju Wsi i Rolnictwa PAN.

Hanegraaff M., Pritoni A. (2019). United in fear: Interest group coalition formation as a weapon of the weak? European Union Politics, 20(2), 198–218. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116518824022

Hoyle R.H. (ed.). (1995). Structural Equation Modeling: Concepts, Issues, and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Jambor A., Gorton M. (2025). Twenty years of EU accession: Learning lessons from Central and Eastern European agriculture and rural areas. Agricultural and Food Economics, 13(1), 1–17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-025-00346-w

Kaine G., Wright V. (2024). Social desirability bias and the prevalence of self-reported conservation behaviour among farmers. Sustainability, 16(22), 9658. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/su16229658

Klüver H. (2020). The survival of interest groups: Evidence from Germany. West European Politics, 43(7), 1436–1454. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1662634

Klüver H. (2013). Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657445.001.0001

Klüver H. (2011). The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in the European Union. European Union Politics, 12(4), 483–506. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116511413163

Klüver H. (2010). Europeanization of lobbying activities: When national interest groups spill over to the European level. Journal of European Integration, 32(2), 175–191. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330903486037

Kohler-Koch B., Kotzian P., Quittkat C. (2017). The multilevel interest representation of national business associations. West European Politics, 40(5), 1046–1065. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1303244

Lukes S. (2005). Power: A Radical View. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-80257-5_2

Matthews A. (2024). Farmer protests and the 2024 European Parliament elections. Intereconomics, 59(2), 83–87. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ie-2024-0018

Mennig P. (2024). A never-ending story of reforms: On the wicked nature of the Common Agricultural Policy. npj Sustainable Agriculture, 2(20). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44264-024-00027-z

Meuwissen M.P.M., Feindt P.H., Garrido A., Mathijs E., Soriano B., Urquhart J., Spiegel A. (eds.). (2022). Resilient and Sustainable Farming Systems in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009093569

Milczarek-Andrzejewska D., Śpiewak R. (2018). Farmers’ associations: Their resources and channels of influence. Evidence from Poland. Sociologia Ruralis, 58(4), 825–845. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12207

Möllers J., Traikova D., Bîrhală B.A.M., Wolz A. (2018). Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania. Post-Communist Economies, 30(1), 56–77. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2017.1361697

Mroczkowska J. (2022). Trapped in the grey zones: Voicing discontent and strategies of resistance in rural Poland. Ethnologia Polona, 43. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23858/ethp.2022.43.3140

Müller M., Rommel J. (2018). Should i stay or should i go? A behavioral approach to organizational choice in Tajikistan’s agriculture. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 43(3), 469–486.

Nedergaard P. (2006). Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model of the common agricultural policy. Public Choice, 127(3–4), 393–413. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-9000-1

Novak M., Lajh D. (2024). New kids on the democracy block: Europeanisation of interest groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Politics and Governance, 12, 7512. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7512

Pecorino P. (2015). Olson’s logic of collective action at fifty. Public Choice, 162(3–4), 243–262. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y

Rausser G.C., Swinnen J., Zusman P. (2011). Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis and Empirical Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511978661

Ritzel C., Mack G., Portmann M., Heitkämper K., El Benni N. (2020). Empirical evidence on factors influencing farmers’ administrative burden: A structural equation modeling approach. PLoS ONE, 15(10), 1–16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241075

Rosner A., Stanny M. (2017). Socio-economic Development of Rural Areas in Poland. Warszawa: Fundacja Europejski Fundusz Rozwoju Wsi Polskiej (EFRWP)–Instytut Rozwoju Wsi i Rolnictwa PAN. DOI: https://doi.org/10.53098/9788394105068

Salhofer K., Hofreither M.F., Sinabell F. (2000). Promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in Austria. Public Choice, 102(3–4), 229–246. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005024920319

Sander A., Ghazoul J., Finger R., Schaub S. (2024). Participation in individual and collective agri-environmental schemes: A synthesis using the theory of planned behaviour. Journal of Rural Studies, 107, 103255. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2024.103255

Sok J., Hogeveen H., Elbers A.R.W., Oude Lansink A.G.J.M. (2015). Farmers’ beliefs and voluntary vaccination schemes: Bluetongue in Dutch dairy cattle. Food Policy, 57, 40–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.09.006

Sokoli O., Xhoxhi O., Skreli E., Imami D., Doluschitz R. (2021). Willingness to cooperate in the context of post-communist economy: Why do local rules matter? World Development Perspectives, 22, 100314. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2021.100314

Stevens F., De Bruycker I. (2020). Influence, affluence and media salience: Economic resources and lobbying influence in the European Union. European Union Politics, 21(4), 728–750. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116520944572

Swinnen J. (2018). The Political Economy of Agricultural and Rural Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Śpiewak R., Milczarek-Andrzejewska D., Ciechomska A. (2016). Agricultural organizations in Poland – an attempt towards a typology. Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development, 4(42), 659–668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17306/JARD.2016.92

Van Winden F. (2004). Interest group behavior and influence. In: C.K. Rowley, F. Schneider (eds.). The Encyclopedia of Public Choice (pp. 118–129). Boston: Springer. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_10

Veitch A. (2025). Unions out of their league? Ethnographic insights into the 2024 French farmer protests. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1–19. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2025.2457081

Weiler F., Reißmann J. (2019). Interest group coalitions: How the intensity of cooperation affects the choice of lobbying strategies. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 8, 91–119. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00047-y

Wolz A., Fritzsch J., Reinsberg K. (2006). The impact of social capital on Polish farm incomes: Findings of an empirical survey. Post-Communist Economies, 18(1), 85–99. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14631370500505347

Woods M., Anderson J., Guilbert S., Watkin S. (2012). ‘The country(side) is angry’: Emotion and explanation in protest mobilization. Social & Cultural Geography, 13(6), 567–585. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2012.704643

Yao M., Xu Y. (2024). Method bias mechanisms and procedural remedies. Sociological Methods & Research, 53(1), 235–278. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00491241211043141

Żuk P. (2025). The European Green Deal and the peasant cause: Class frustration, cultural backlash and right-wing nationalist populism in farmers’ protests in Poland. Journal of Rural Studies, 119, 103708. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103708