Koordynacja działań zbiorowych i metody sprawiedliwego podziału w sektorze publicznym

Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska

doi:10.53098/wir.2023.1.198/04

Authors

Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska Dr hab. Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska, prof. UPP, Uniwersytet Przyrodniczy w Poznaniu, Wydział Ekonomiczny, Katedra Ekonomii i Polityki Gospodarczej w Agrobiznesie, ul. Wojska Polskiego 28, 60-637 Poznań https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4353-8196

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.53098/wir.2023.1.198/04

Keywords:

fair-division, cooperation, experimental economics

Abstract

The objective of the paper was to present theoretical concept of collective action problem and to propose fair-division methods, which might be used in agricultural policy budgeting. The experimental economics results on the propensity of individuals to cooperation and fair divisions, and the possibilities of using fair-division algorithms, which are to lead to acceptable divisions in the practice of public choice, were presented. The results of the research indicate that achieving a sense of fairness requires the transparency of divisions based on a clearly defined selection of criteria and methods.

Pogłębione rozważania na temat koncepcji sprawiedliwości, kryteriów oraz metod podziałów zawarto w monografii pt. Sprawiedliwy podział. Kryteria, metody i aplikacje (Kiryluk-Dryjska 2019). Niniejszy artykuł zawiera uaktualnione wybrane fragmenty tej monografii.

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