Koordynacja działań zbiorowych i metody sprawiedliwego podziału w sektorze publicznym
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53098/wir012023/04Słowa kluczowe:
sprawiedliwy podział, współpraca, ekonomia eksperymentalnaAbstrakt
Celem artykułu było zaprezentowanie teoretycznych podstaw problemu koordynacji działań zbiorowych oraz zaproponowanie metod sprawiedliwego podziału, które mogą być zastosowane do konstruowania budżetów polityki rolnej. W publikacji przedyskutowano wyniki badań eksperymentalnych nad skłonnością jednostek do kooperacji i podziałów sprawiedliwych, a następnie zaprezentowano możliwości zastosowania algorytmów sprawiedliwego podziału, które mają prowadzić do akceptowanych podziałów w praktyce wyboru publicznego. Wyniki badań wskazują, że osiągnięcie poczucia sprawiedliwości wymaga transparentności podziałów na podstawie jednoznacznie określonego wyboru kryteriów i metod.
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